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CHAPTER 7 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
MONROE INKER 
§7.1. Alimony and child support: Test of husband's resources. 
There was but one significant case decided by the Supreme Judicial 
Court during the 1961 SURVEY year in the field of domestic relations. 
However, that case is of great importance to all practitioners for it may 
radically curtail the power of the probate judge to award alimony and 
support. 
In Hillery v. Hillery,! the wife obtained a decree of divorce on the 
ground of cruel and abusive treatment and was awarded custody of the 
two children of the marriage, $125 per week for the maintenance of the 
minor children of the marriage, and $125 per week as alimony. It 
appeared that the libelee was paid a salary of $12,000 a year by the 
M. H. Hillery Company, Inc., of which he was treasurer and secretary, 
this being his principal source of income. His net therefrom after 
tax and other deductions amounted to $9876 per year or $189.93 per 
week. It was found, however, that his standard of living was enhanced 
appreciably by gifts from his father and sister and by payment ofcer-
tain of his personal expenses by the corporation. 
The libelee appealed from that part of the decree ordering the 
payment of $250 per week. The trial judge made a report of material 
facts, in which he found that: (1) the libelee was a member of the Bar 
with little or no practice; (2) he was treasurer and secretary of the 
family corporation; (3) his sister was president of said corporation; 
(4) he and his sister held all of the stock of the corporation as trustees 
under the will of their mother for their father's benefit for life and 
that, upon the father's death, the libelee and his sister were to receive 
all of the stock; (5) the libelee has a yearly salary of $12,000; (6) the 
corporation paid living expenses of the libelee and his family, e.g., 
automobile fuel, telephone bills, and restaurant dinners; (7) he 
received $25 per week expense money from the corporation; (8) he 
received $200 per year from investments; (9) he and his wife owned, 
as tenants by the entirety, their home having an $8000 equity; (10) 
he and his wife owned commercial property having an $8000 equity; 
(II) he owned shares of an investment trust worth approximately 
$1500; (12) his and his sister's remainder interest in the trust of the 
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corporate stock was worth $16,000; (13) the records of the corporation 
were kept in a very irregular and unusual manner; (14) no records 
were kept at the corporation's place of business; (15) an outside book-
keeper worked on the books entirely on information furnished by the 
libelee, his sister, or his father; (16) his sister and his father were 
reluctant to furnish any information relative to the income of the 
libelee; (17) the libelee and the corporation's bookkeeper were ob-
viously evasive; and (18) the libelee did not furnish the true informa-
tion he had in his possession. The evidence was reported. 
The question before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether the 
trial judge could properly have found that the libelee's resources were 
sufficiently in excess of his admitted salary so as to justify the payments 
ordered. It was held that gifts given to the libelee by his father and 
sister, and the corporation's payment of certain of his personal 
expenses, were not factors upon which the libelee's ability to pay could 
be based. Advances to the libelee from the corporation were either 
gifts or loans that could be discontinued at any time and did not 
constitute additional resources that would afford the basis for the 
challenged orders. The libelee's evasiveness or untruthfulness cannot 
be the basis of a finding that his income was substantially in excess of 
what was actually shown. The decree, insofar as it ordered payments 
by the libelee of $250 per week, was held not to be supported by the 
evidence and to be plainly wrong. 
The probate judges and practitioners alike are now faced with the 
task of determining the full import and effect of the Hillery case. 
The decision suggests a few very important questions: (1) Should 
not the corporation's payment of its officer's personal expenses be a 
factor in determining his net worth, when the officer's ability to pay 
alimony is in issue? (2) Are not accounting chicanery and a sketchy, 
irregular, and unusual manner of keeping corporate books and records 
on the part of the libelee factors to be taken into consideration by a 
probate judge in making an award for' alimony and support? (3) Is 
the net result of this decision a serious curtailment of the discretion 
of the probate judge? 
It may be that the Court is saying no more than that the libelant has 
failed to supply the Probate Court with sufficient evidence to warrant 
the award that was made by the probate judge. Such a circumscribed 
interpretation of the opinion is doubtful. To say in one sentence that 
gifts from the libelee's father and sister and the payment of certain 
of his personal expenses by the corporation "enhanced appreciably" 
the libelee's standard of living, and in the next sentence to say that the 
libelee's ability to pay cannot be based on either of these factors, is to 
open up a challenging issue. It is one thing to take the position that 
these factors alone would not warrant the probate judge's action; it is 
quite another to say that these factors are entitled to no consideration. 
Ordinarily it is virtually impossible in cases of this type for counsel 
for the libelant to adduce the kind and quality of evidence that this 
decision seemingly would require. It would seem that the libelee's 
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worth has been enhanced by the corporation's payment of his personal 
expenses. He and his family lived very well under this arrangement, 
and the fact that it is illegal for corporate officers so to use corporate 
funds or that this "service" of the corporation could be discontinued 
at any time should not mean that the trial judge is precluded from 
considering this source of enhanced worth in determining how much 
the libelee can afford to pay. The fact is that the family corporation 
has paid these expenses in the past, and it is not wrong for a trial 
judge to· determine that these payments were in reality a form of 
additional compensation and an integral part of the libelee-officer's 
worth. The trial judge did no more than recognize that expense 
account living has become an accepted fringe benefit for countless 
close corporation officers. 
One major source of "additional income," which in these cases is 
most difficult of accurate proof, is the "loan-gift'" source. In speaking 
of advances made by the corporation to the libelee, the Supreme 
Judicial Court said that these advances were either gifts or loans, and if 
gifts they could be discontinued at any time, but if loans they did not 
enhance the libelee's net worth and could likewise be discontinued 
at any time.2 The argument that "loans" and "gifts" and "paid 
expenses" could be "discontinued at any time" by the corporation 
seems to overlook the possibility that salary also could be "discontinued 
at any time." Since gifts like this are of questionable validity at best, 
most close corporations that operate in this manner assign the label 
"loan" to this type of advance. What the Court has said is of course 
true, but is it not paying more attention to form than to substance? 
Obviously the Court is aware that a close corporation accountant 
may, by manipulation, show a profit or a loss in any given week or 
month if the furtherance of a tax evasion, or other, scheme so demands. 
The Court is likewise aware that this same type of manipulation is 
available when it is desired that "additional compensation" to its 
officers be depicted as "loans to officers" on the corporate books. Thus 
it is difficult to understand how the Court can expect counsel to show 
income from the corporation in excess of salary when his only tools 
are the subpoenaed books and records of the close family corporation 
which, in fact, he is fighting. Perhaps the Court, on these issues, should 
distinguish between the close and publicly held corporations. 
The Court has never established any precise formula to be employed 
in ascertaining the amount of alimony and support awards, nor did it 
attempt to do so here. In its opinion the Court cited Whitney v. 
Whitney}) Coe v. Coe,4 and Wilson v. Wilson5 in support of the prop-
osition that, in cases of this type, "The decision is largely within the 
discretion of the judge after a consideration of all the facts, including 
the needs of the wife and the children, the financial worth of the 
2342 Mass. at 373-374, 173 N .E.2d at 271-272. 
3325 Mass. 28, 30, 88 N.E.2d 647, 650 (1949). 
4313 Mass. 232,235·236,46 N.E.2d 1017, 1019-1020 (1943). 
5329 Mass. 208, 211, 107 N.E.2d 195, 197 (1952). 
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husband, the station in life of the parties, and their mode of living." 6 
This is an enumeration of the various broad guiding principles that 
Massachusetts courts have followed in arriving at proper amounts of 
alimony and support.7 
It is submitted that the sum total of the trial judge's action in the 
present case amounts to a realistic appraisal of the evidence offered 
and an equally realistic appraisal of the reasons for the refusal 
of the libelee and his family to present to the court the information 
concerning the libelee's financial standing, which was exclusively 
within their control. Instead of upholding the probate judge's 
exercise of discretion, the Court labels this decision "plainly wrong." 
The Supreme Judicial Court thus requires probate judges to blind 
themselves to the realities of close corporation life and in so doing has 
seriously curtailed that traditional discretion that has been the 
hallmark and essential characteristic of probate courts in this Common-
wealth. 
It seems that in cases of this type the trial judge is now precluded 
from going beyond "tax return worth" or beyond the libelee's own 
evidence of his financial worth. He has been forbidden to delve into 
the reasons prompting a libelee to conceal a true and complete state-
ment of his worth. He is not to make estimates of a libelee's future 
worth based upon an intelligent appraisal of evidence concerning 
past financial worth. 
Other jurisdictions, however, have given their approval to much 
broader exercises of probate discretion than has the Supreme Judicial 
Court.8 The following statement seems to sum up current judicial 
expression elsewhere in this area: 
Probably the most widely accepted expression of judicial thought 
is that the alimony should be such as to maintain the wife in the 
station in life to which she belongs and in the style which the 
resources and the social standing and pecuniary faculties and 
future prospects of the husband entitle her.D 
6342 Mass. 371, 372-373,173 N.E.2d 269, 271 (1961). 
7 See Briggs v. Briggs, 319 Mass. 149, 65 N.E.2d 9 (1946); Topor v. Topor, 287 
Mass. 473, 192 N.E. 52 (1934); Brown v. Brown, 222 Mass. 415, 417, 111 N.E. 42, 43 
(1916); Graves v. Graves, 108 Mass. 314 (1871); Burrows v. Purple, 107 Mass. 428, 
435 (1871). 
8 The New York courts usually consider all items touching upon the financial 
status of the husband as well as the parties' social station and standard of living. 
Stevens v. Stevens, 125 Misc. 451, 211 N.Y. Supp. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1925), all'd, 214 App. 
Div. 785, 211 N.Y. Supp. 193 (2d Dept. 1925) (amount and size of estate); Hoas v. 
Hoas, 298 N.Y. 69, 80 N_E.2d 237 (1948) (capacity to earn rather than current in-
come); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 229 N.Y. 255, 128 N.E. 117 (1926), and DeBrouwere v. 
DeBrouwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 96 N.E. 722 (1911) (manner in which parties have lived). 
Cf. Brokow v. Brokow, 66 Misc. 307, 123 N.Y. Supp_ 17 (Sup. Ct. 1910). New York 
courts have the discretion to take all relevant factors into consideration in com-
puting the amount of alimony to be awarded. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§1155. 1164, 
1169,1170. 
9 Schwent v. Schwent, 209 S.W.2d 546 (Mo. App. 1948). 
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The Missouri and Virginia courts have held that the husband's 
earning capacity is an important consideration in determining his 
abilty to pay.1O This "earning capacity" includes not only the 
husband's actual income, which is determined by substracting his 
business expensesll and his income taxes, according to the Minnesota 
court,12 but also his ability to earn more than he receives at present.13 
The Louisiana court held in Butterworth v. Butterworth14 that, 
under an alimony statute, the court was not required to lower an 
award by taking into consideration income which a husband lost by 
resigning his position in order to deprive his family of additional 
income. Estimates of a husband's future income also have been held 
to make up part of the husband's earning capacity.15 
Other factors that courts of other jurisdictions have considered in 
determining the husband's ability to pay are his debts,16 the amount 
and value of the property he owns,17 whether such property produces 
income,18 the source from which it was acquired,IO the wife's contribu-
tion to its accumulation,20 and whether it was acquired before or after 
the marriage.21 The fact that the husband's property is in another 
state will not exempt it from consideration.22 In some states the 
courts adopt as their guide, in determining the amount to be awarded, 
the social standard that the wife would have enjoyed if she had 
continued living in a state of domestic happiness with her husband. 
This appears to be the rule in New Jersey.23 In Michigan, the wife 
is to be left in a position "not inferior" to what she would have been 
if the marriage had been undissolved.24 
It is interesting to note that the Hillery case seems to be in direct 
conflict with the well-reasoned Kentucky case of Rigsby v. Rigsby,25 
which held that when the husband is an unwilling witness, refuses to 
disclose the amount and extent of his property, and shows a disposition 
to conceal or withhold from the court the exact value of his property 
and his financial standing, doubts arising from the available evidence 
as to these factors may be resolved against him. 
10 Bittel v. Bittel, 147 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. App. 1941); Cecil v. Cecil, 179 Va. 274, 
19 S.E.2d 64 (1942). 
11 Goodloe v. Goodloe, 294 Ky. 100, 171 S.W.2d 18 (1943). 
12 Baker v. Baker, 224 Minn. 117,28 N.W.2d 164 (1947). 
13 See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 187 Va. 595, 47 S.E.2d 436 (1948). 
14 203 La. 465,14 So.2d 59 (1943). 
15 See Nelson v. Nelson, 100 Cal. App. 2d 348, 223 P.2d 636 (1950); Flanders v. 
Flanders, 241 Iowa 159,40 N.W.2d 468 (1950). 
18 Russell v. Russell, 142 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1944). 
17 Braiser v. Braiser, 200 Okla. 689, 200 P.2d 427 (1948). 
18 Nickerson v. Nickerson, 152 Neb. 799,42 N .W.2d 861 (1950). 
19 Timme v. Timme, 103 Ind. App. 569,9 N.E.2d III (1937). 
20 Poppe v. Poppe, 144 Ind. App. 348, 52 N.E.2d 506 (1944). 
21 Rovder v. Rovder, 78 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio App. 1946). 
22 See Fuller v. Fuller, 175 Ore. 136, 131 P.2d 979 (1944). 
23 See Polyckronos v. Polyckronos, 17 N.J. Misc. 250, 8 A.2d 265 (Ch. 1939). 
24 Wood v. Wood, 288 Mich. 14,284 N.W. 627 (1939). 
25 266 Ky. 291, 97 S.W.2d 235 (1936). 
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It is submitted that the Supreme Judicial Court either should 
establish a precise method of ascertaining "worth" for use in cases 
in which the husband-libelee is an officer-shareholder in a close family 
corporation or should adopt the philosophy underlying the Kentucky 
court's decision in Rigsby v. Rigsby. Probably the better course would 
be to set out a precise method for these particular cases. It is suggested 
that a variation of the "percentage method" or the "net worth method," 
both presently employed by the Internal Revenue Service in federal 
tax evasion cases, might be the answer.28 The adoption of such a 
formula for ascertaining a libelee-officer's worth would enable a 
libelant's counsel in actions similar to the present case to establish an 
arbitrary figure as the net worth of the libelee who shows a disposition 
either alone or in concert with his fellow officers to conceal the exact 
extent of his property, present financial standing, and probable future 
prospects. 
If one of these arbitrary methods had been employed in the Hillery 
case and if the "paid expenses," "loans,'" and "gifts" were "discon-
tinued" by the corporation at some future time, the libelee would 
not be without a remedy, since he could file a petition for modification 
of the decree. However, to leave the present libelant with no remedy 
except the petition for modification leaves her with nothing, since 
once the libelee has successfully concealed his worth it becomes vir-
tually impossible for the libelant to point up the lie. 
28 The Tax Court and other courts have approved use by the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue of the so-called "percentage method" of computing taxable in-
come. This method is often resorted to in the case of taxpayers whose books are 
lost or destroyed or so confused as to be useless in determining net income. Under 
this arbitrary method, net income is computed by the use of an average percentage 
table based on returns from taxpayers in the same kind of business. P-H, Fed. 
Tax. Servo n6902-6903. 
The "net worth increase" and the "bank deposits-expenditures" are other methods 
of reconstructing income used by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue where the 
taxpayer's books are unsatisfactory. The Tax Court has approved a reconstruction 
of the income of a horse race bookmaker from the amount of increase in his net 
worth plus $50 a week living expenses and an unexplained withdrawal from the 
bank. When there were no bank deposits, the Tax Court has approved a computa-
tion of a taxpayer's income based on the use of capital assets as reflected by record 
ownership of stock, plus personal and living expenses. It approved reconstruction 
of income based on high payments of mortgage interest, living expenses, medical 
expenses, and money in a safe-deposit box. P-H, Fed. Tax. Servo 1[1[6872-6881, 6892-
6896. 
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